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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court correctly hold that the claims 
against defendant Clearfield City are barred by governmental 
immunity as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 as amended. 
Did the trial court correctly conclude that the 1984 
amendment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 applies retroactively as 
codification of prior case law. 
Did the trial court correctly hold that Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is not self-executing and that 
there is no legislative authority allowing plaintiffs to sue pur-
suant to said constitutional provision. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 as amended and Article I, Section 
22 of the Utah Constitution will determine the outcome of this 
appeal. The text of each provision is set out in Addendum A of 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs Rick and Cherlynn Hamblin have resided in a 
home located at 576 North Barlow Street, Clearfield City, Davis 
County, Utah, for approximately the past 11 years. 
Home construction in the subdivision surrounding the 
Hamblins1 home was commenced in 1978 or 1979, after the Hamblins 
had moved into their home. In conjunction with the commencement 
of this subdivision, the slope of the land surrounding the home 
was altered to alleviate soil slippage. As a result of the 
alteration in the elevation between the Hamblins1 home and other 
- 1 . 
homes in the neighborhood, rain and snow runoff is directed 
towards the Hamblins' property. 
The Hamblins began to experience flooding problems 
beginning in May, 1981. Subsequent attempts to correct the 
deficient drainage system were made by Clearfield City but proved 
ineffective. 
The Hamblins assert that their damages were caused by 
flooding due to improperly designed and constructed flood drainage 
system in the vicinity of their home. The damages to their home 
has solely resulted from flood waters after severe rain storms. 
The Hamblins continued to experienced flooding difficulties in ?82 
and '83. 
Suit was filed by the Hamblins against Clearfield City on 
April 10, 1985, after Clearfield City refused to reimburse the 
Hamblins for damages caused by flooding which occurred in the 
latter part of 1984. 
Clearfield City filed a motion for summary judgment on 
November 6, 1985. In the ruling on that motion, issued December 
17, 1985, the district court ruled that the Hamblins1 action was 
barred by Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3, as amended. In the same 
ruling, the district court also allowed the Hamblins to amend 
their complaint to state a cause of action for inverse condem-
nation under Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of Utah. 
After hearing arguments on Clearfield City's second 
motion for summary judgment on January 30, 1986, the district 
court in a ruling issued April 29, 1986 granted Clearfield City's 
-2-
motion. Subsequently, on June 23, 1986, judgment was entered 
dismissing the Hamblins1 complaint with prejudice. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Hamblins1 action is barred by the 1984 amendment to 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 which provides absolute immunity to 
Clearfield City. Said statute should be applied retroactively as 
clarification of the common law as enunciated in Reeder v. Brigham 
City, 17 Utah 2d 298, 413 P.2d 300 (1966). The legislative 
history of §63-30-3 establishes that it was the legislative intent 
that the amendment apply retrospectively to causes of actions 
arising prior to the effective date of the amendment. 
This court has previously held tha£ Article I, Section 22 
of the Utah Constitution is not self-executing and that without 
legislative consent, the cause of action under Article I, Section 
22 is prohibited. Furthermore, the theory of "inverse condem-
nation" has not been recognized in Utah. 
Without legislative authority, the Hamblins1 remedy is 
limited to recovery under the lawful exercise of eminent domain. 
However, under the exercise of eminent domain a party may not 
recover damages unless the alleged injuries are a result of the 
direct, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the right of 
eminent domain. Equitable estoppel is not applicable in this 
action inasmuch as the Hamblins1 claim was barred prior to the 
enactment of the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 under 
the case law previously announced by this court. Finally, there 
is strong public policy reasons why Clearfield City should be 
--}-
granted immunity from suit with regards to the management of flood 
waters and storm drainage systems, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE CLAIMS AGAINST CLEARFIELD CITY ARE 
BARRED BY THE 1984 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE 
ANN. §63-30-3, WHICH PROVIDES ABSOLUTE 
IMMUNITY TO CLEARFIELD CITY. 
In 1984, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-3. As amended, §63-30-3 now reads as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in 
this Chapter, all governmental entities 
are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmen-
tal function, governmentally-owned hospi-
tal, nursing home, or other governmental 
health care facility, from an approved 
medical, nursing, or other professional 
health care clinical training program con-
ducted in either public or private 
facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other 
natural disasters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems by governmental entities are con-
sidered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers 
and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those acti-
vities. (Emphasis added). 
Thus, as amended, §63-30-3 clearly grants immunity for 
all governmental entities and their respective officers and 
employees for any injury or damage resulting from the management 
of flood waters and from the construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems. 
The second paragraph of §63-30-3 is a blanket grant of 
immunity that is not, unlike the first paragraph of §63-30-3, sub-
ject to the waivers of immunity found in the later sections of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act. In other words, the immunity 
granted by the second paragraph of §63-30-3, as amended, does not 
contain a clause "except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter.ff The only rational statutory construction of the second 
paragraph of §63-30-3 is that the 1984 amendment provides total 
immunity for the acts specified in that paragraph, i.e., immunity 
for any injury or damage resulting from the management of flood 
waters or from the construction, repair, or operation of flood and 
storm systems by governmental entities. 
In addition, this court heretofore has held that the 
operation of a subsurface storm drainage system is a governmental 
function for purposes of governmental immunity. Reeder v. Brigham 
City, 17 Utah 2d 298, 413 P.2d 300 (1966). In Reeder, the plain-
tiff's lands were flooded from diverted surface and percolating 
waters from the defendant municipality's man-made storm and 
drainage system. The controversy arose in the northeastern part 
of Brigham City, which had experienced a building boom on the 
grounds which originally had been mostly cultivated orchard lands. 
When the orchard lands were converted to housing, an underground 
drainage system was established, curbs and gutters were built, and 
roads were hard-surfaced by the defendant municipality. In 1962, 
for the first time, waters from the drainage system and those 
which had accumulated from the curbs, gutters and roads were 
channeled into an underground drainage system and discharged into 
a ditch. Before the curbs, gutters and roads were built, the 
plaintiff's lands were never flooded during times of heavy rain-
fall or spring runoffs, but following said installations, the 
plaintiff1s lands were flooded. The plaintiff brought action 
seeking to enjoin the municipal corporation from diverting surface 
and percolating waters into the man-made storm drainage system. 
The lower court granted the injunction and awarded the plaintiff 
nominal damages. 
On appeal, the defendant municipality contended that it 
was not subject to liability for damages because it was acting in 
a governmental capacity. In sustaining the defendant's conten-
tion and overruling the lower court's decision, this court held 
that the operation of a storm drainage system is a governmental 
function for the purposes of governmental immunity. 
Although the governmental/proprietary function dichotomy 
used by the court in Reeder has been subsequently rejected in 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980), 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 as amended, provides that governmental 
actions to prevent or mitigate flooding is a governmental function 
for purposes of governmental immunity. Therefore, it is clear 
that Clearfield City is immune from any suit, including the 
instant action arising out of the municipality's construction, 
operation, and maintenance of a flood and storm system. To allow 
the Hamblins to maintain an action against Clearfield City in the 
instant case would be in direct contravention of the legislative 
intent surrounding the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the 
express language of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3. 
This is not a case of first impression at the district 
court level. At least five district court judges in the State of 
Utah have already ruled that the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-3 provides absolute immunity for governmental entities from 
suit for any injury or damages resulting from the management of 
flood waters or the construction, repair, and operation of flood 
and storm systems by governmental entities. The the Honorable 
Scott Daniels so ruled in the case of Brakensiek v. Dixie South 
Corp., No. C84-0564 (3rd Dist. Salt Lake County 1984); the 
Honorable David Samm so ruled in the case of Palmer v. State Farm 
Insurance Co., No. 7732 (4th Dist. Millard County 1984); the 
Honorable Cullen Christensen so ruled in the case of Chesley v. 
Delta City, No. 7486 (4th Dist. Millard County 1984); the 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock so ruled in the case of Fairchild v. 
State of Utah, No. 7733 (4th Dist. Millard County 1984); the 
Honorable George Ballif so ruled in the case of Mendenhal v. Orem 
City, No. 62597 (4th Dist. Utah County 1984). See Addendum lfB" 
t h r o u g h f fF l f , r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
POINT I I . 
THE 1984 AMENDMENT TO UTAH CODE ANN. 
§63-30-3 IS APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT 
ACTION AND SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY 
AS A CLARIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW. 
Although the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 
was not made explicity retroactive to causes of action arising 
prior to the enactment of the amendment, this court decided the 
issue of the retroactive application of the 1984 amendment in 
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980). In Frank, the plain-
tiff's son was admitted to the University of Utah Medical Center 
for psychiatric treatment. While undergoing treatment, the son 
committed suicide in March, 1976. The plaintiff brought suit, 
alleging that the defendants were negligent in their treatment of 
his son. In 1978, the Utah Legislature amended Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-3 to provide governmental entities immunity from suits 
arising from state and local government providing medical treat-
ment. The 1978 amendment is now the first paragraph of Utah Code 
Ann. §63-30-3, as amended. The State of Utah moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the State of Utah was protected by 
sovereign immunity as defined under the 1978 Act. This motion was 
granted. 
On appeal, this court reversed on other grounds but 
clearly ruled that the 1984 amendment, while not made expressly 
retroactive by the legislature, should be so applied even though 
the plaintiff's cause of action had arisen prior to the effective 
date of the amendment. The holding in Frank is indistinguishable 
from the pending case except as this action relates to the second 
paragraph of Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3. 
In addition, the legislative history of Senate Bill 97, 
which amended Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3, makes clear the legisla-
ture's intent that the amendment apply retrospectively to causes 
of action arising prior to the effective date of the amendment. 
The first paragraph of Senate Bill 97 describes the statute as "an 
act relating to flooding; clarifying flooding as a governmental 
function for purposes of governmental immunity . . ." (Emphasis 
added). It is significant to note that the legislature in 
enacting the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 was 
clarifying an immunity that the legislature considered to have 
always existed. The enactment of the 1984 amendment supports the 
holding in Reeder v. Brigham City, 413 P.2d 300, that local 
municipalities are immune from suit from causes of action arising 
out of the construction, operation, or maintenance of flood water 
drainage systems. A copy of Senate Bill 97 is attached as 
Addendum "G". 
Thus, it is not necessary to show that §63-30-3 is 
retroactive. Even if the court in this action follows the common 
law as announced in the Reeder decision, the Hamblins would not be 
entitled to recover. However, the law is absolutely clear that 
§63-30-3 denies recovery and that it should be applied retro-
actively as a pronouncement of the existing common law. 
POINT III. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING AND 
DOES NOT GIVE CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE 
SUED. 
This court has held that Article I, Section 22 of the 
Constitution which provides that property should not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation is not self-
executing. The Court stated in Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 10 
Utah 2d 417, 354 P.2d 105 (1960), 
. . . [Consistently and historically we have 
ruled that the State may not be sued without 
its consent; taken the view that Article I, 
Section 22 of our Constitution is not self-
executing, nor does it give consent to be 
sued, implied or otherwise; and that to 
secure such consent is a legislative matter, 
a principle recognized by the legislature 
itself. 
id. 354 P.2d at 106. 
The Fairclough case involved an action by property 
owners against the Utah Road Commission for damages incurred when 
the Road Commission constructed a highway project where the grade 
level was reduced to about 16 feet below the owner's abutting 
land. This court held that the state could not be sued without 
its consent and that Article I, Section 22 was not self-executing 
and did not constitute consent by the state to be sued. 
As stated in Fairclough, this court has consistently 
recognized that in order for the state or its subdivisions to be 
sued, the legislature must provide for the method. The legisla-
ture has also recognized this principle and has provided for suits 
to be filed against the state by creating the Utah Goverraental 
Immunity Act and by providing legislation for recovery under the 
exercise of eminent domain. 
Judge Robert Bullock recognized that the Utah Supreme 
Court had held that Article I, Section 22 was not self-executing 
when he wrote his dissenting opinion in the case of Andrus v. 
State, 541 P.2d 1117, 1122 (1975). In Andrus, a homeowner 
brought an action to recover for damages sustained to his home 
and property from flood waters allegedly resulting from the 
negligent construction of a highway project. This court stated 
that the state was not immune from suit for damages caused by the 
highway construction project under the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Judge Bullock dissented on the sole ground that the plaintiff 
sought to recover against the state under Section 22 of Article I 
of the Constitution pursuant to the doctrine of "inverse condem-
nation11 rather than under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. In 
taking that position, Judge Bullock recognized that the decisions 
of this court, unless overruled, precluded such result. In other 
words, Judge Bullock was arguing that Section 22 of Article I 
should be self-executing and that a party should be allowed to sue 
the state without the state's consent. However, as indicated 
above, case law indicates that Section 22, Article 1 of the Utah 
Constitution is not self-executing and without legislative enact-
ment, a party may not sue the state or its subdivision without the 
state consenting to suit. 
In the present case, the legislature has not provided a 
method which would enable the Hamblins to collect damages from 
the City of Clearfield under the provisions of Article I, Section 
22. In fact, the legislature has specifically stated by enacting 
§63-30-3 of the Utah Code Ann. that the management, construction, 
repair and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are to be considered government functions and as such, 
the government entity is immune from suit for any injury or 
damage. Thus, the Hamblins may not recover under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. The Hamblins1 oply claim under Article 
I, Section 22 of the Constitution is under the lawful exercise of 
eminent domain. However, even under the exercise of eminent 
domain, consequential damages are not recoverable. 
_ i 1 _ 
POINT IV. 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION DOES NOT ENTITLE THE HAMBLINS 
TO RECOVER CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. 
As stated above, without legislative authority a party 
may not recover under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. Recovery under Article I, Section 22 is limited to 
the lawful exercise of eminent domain. However, even under the 
exercise of eminent domain a party may not recover for damages 
unless the alleged injuries are a result of the direct, necessary, 
and unavoidable consequences of the right of eminent domain. Such 
was the holding in the case of Lund v. Salt Lake County, 58 Utah 
546, 200 P. 510 (1921). In Lund, the plaintiff brought an action 
against Salt Lake County to recover damages for injury to certain 
fish ponds and destruction of fish contained therein situated in 
Salt Lake County. Near plaintiff's property, the County had 
constructed and was maintaining a reservoir in connection with its 
water supply system. Following the flushing of the reservoir, 
impure water was allowed to flow into plaintiff's fish ponds 
resulting in damage to the fish ponds and destruction of the fish 
contained therein. Plaintiff alleged that he was entitled to com-
pensation on the theory that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution provided that private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compensation. 
In discussing Article I, Section 22, this court stated: 
We are clearly of the opinion that the 
damages for which compensation is allowed 
under Article I, Section 22, of the State 
Constitution are such as are the direct 
consequences of the lawful exercise of the 
right of eminent domain, and that ordi-
narily such damages are unavoidable. 
id. 200 P. at 514. 
This court held that the plaintiff could not recover 
because of the damages incurred were not the result of the direct 
consequence of the exercise of the right of eminent domain. 
Likewise, in the present case, there has been no taking 
or damaging of the Hamblins1 property which is a result of the 
direct, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the exercise of 
the right of eminent domain; in fact there has been no exercise of 
the eminent domain powers. 
The Hamblins claim that they are entitled to compensation 
for their property under a theory of "inverse condemnation.11 
The Hamblins have cited the case of Hampton v. State, 21 Utah 2d 
342, 445 P.2d 708 (1969), in support of this proposition. 
However, the Hampton case involved a condemnation action in con-
nection with the construction of a highway. Under those cir-
cumstances, there was a statutory right to bring the action. In 
the instant case, there is a statutory prohibition against 
bringing the action and therefore the provisions of Article I, 
Section 22 are not available to the plaintiffs. 
The Hamblins cite Weber v. Salt Lake City, 40 Utah 221, 
120 P. 503 (1911), as authority that substantial interference with 
the use and enjoyment of property amounts to a taking of property 
under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution. The Weber 
case, however, involved the lawful exercise of the right of emi-
nent domain and the removal of soil which supported the plain-
tiff's retaining wall. Because the damages claimed were the 
direct consequences of a lawful exercise of the right of eminent 
domain, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Again, in the pre-
sent case, there are no damages which are a result of the direct 
consequences of the lawful exercise of the right of eminent 
domain. 
In those cases involving eminent domain, recovery has 
been allowed when there has been an actual taking of property. 
Such were the facts in State v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 331, 452 
P.2d 881 (1969). In Willi ams, the appellants/defendants sought 
compensation for alleged damages when the State in widening and 
improving its highway, took a 37 foot strip of defendant's land 
which caused the traffic to be nearer to defendants' home than it 
formerly had been. In a condemnation proceedings, the defendants 
were awarded $750 for the value of the land, and it also found 
that the defendants' land was depreciated in the sum of $3,896 for 
greater traffic noise due to the fact that the traveled portion of 
the improved highway was closer to the defendants' residence. The 
trial court did not allow recovery of the $3,896 for the depre-
ciated value of the property because the damages were not a direct 
result of the taking of defendants' land. This court upheld the 
trial court and stated that all damages not caused by the taking 
or the severing of the land or the manner of the construction of 
the improvements are consequential and are not within the protec-
tion of Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution which provides 
1 /. 
that private property shall not be taken or damaged from public 
use without just compensation. 
The Harablins cite in their brief the case of Hubble v. 
Cache County Drainage Distr. #3, 120 Utah 651, 237 P.2d 843 
(1951). In Hubble, this court held that a drainage district 
created by statute could not increase its system or facility so as 
to create additional burdens on the land of those outside the 
district without responding in damages, resorting to eminent 
domain, or being subject of an injunction. The Hubble decision, 
however, is inapplicable in the present case because there are no 
drainage districts involved. This court has held that drainage 
districts are not governmental bodies and as such are not subject 
to the sovereign immunity which the City of Clearfield is entitled 
to under §63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. In 
Nestman v. South Davis County Water Improvement Dist., 16 Utah 2d 
198, 398 P.2d 203 (1965), this court stated: 
It is significant to note that the defendant 
water district is somewhat different in 
character than the governmental bodies which 
have historically been accord in sovereign 
immunity. It is not an entity created 
directly by the legislature or by the 
Constitution and cannot properly be regarded 
as the same type of sovereign entity as an 
arm of the agency of the state government, 
or as a city or a county. 
Ld. 398 P.2d at 204-205. 
The Hamblins have failed to cite any cases in which a 
Utah district court or this court has ruled that the provisions of 
§63-30-3 are unconstitutional and in violation of Article I, 
Section 22 of the Constitution. 
_ 1 ^ _ 
Rather, Clearfield City has cited this court's decision 
of Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105, which specifi-
cally held that Article I, Section 22 is not self-executing. 
Further, Clearfield City has cited six different district court 
judges in the State of Utah which have ruled that §63-30-3 pro-
vides an absolute immunity for governmental entities from suit for 
any injury or damages resulting from the management of flood 
waters. The Harablins have failed to cite any case law either on 
the district court level or the Supreme Court level in which their 
position has been followed. 
POINT V. 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS NOT APPLICABLE 
INASMUCH AS CLEARFIELD CITY HAS NOT 
INTENTIONALLY OR OTHERWISE INDUCED THE 
HAMBLINS INTO A COURSE OF ACTION NOR 
HAVE THE HAMBLINS SUFFERED INJURIES OR 
INJUSTICE AS A RESULT OF CLEARFIELD CITY'S 
ACTIONS. 
The Hamblins assert that Clearfield City should be 
estopped from claiming governmental immunity since Clearfield City 
paid some of the claims submitted by the Hamblins, and that they 
relied on the actions of Clearfield City and delayed filing suit 
against Clearfield City. The Hamblins claim that as a result, 
they filed their action after the immunity amendment was passed by 
the Utah Legislature, thus barring their claim. 
In more than one instance, the Utah Supreme Court has 
defined the elements of equitable estoppel. In Morgan v. Board of 
State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Estoppel is a doctrine of equity pro-
posed to rescue from loss a party who has, 
without fault, been deluded into a course of 
action by the wrong or neglect of another. 
The measure we apply to plaintiffs1 claim of 
estoppel is an adaptation to this case of 
the standard heretofore approved by this 
court: Estoppel arises when a party 
(defendant) by his acts, representations, or 
omissions, or by his silence when he ought 
to speak, intentionally or through culpable 
negligence, induces another (plaintiffs) to 
believe certain facts to exist and that such 
other (plaintiffs) acting with reasonable 
prudence and diligence, relies and acts 
thereon so that he will suffer an injustice 
if the former (defendant) is permitted to 
deny the existence of such facts. 
I_d. at 697. 
In Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 602 P.2d 
689 (Utah 1979), the court stated: 
The elements essential to invoke the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel are: 
(1) An admission, statement, or act 
inconsistent with the claim afterwards 
asserted, 
(2) Action by the other party on the 
faith of such admission, statement, or act, 
and 
(3) Injury to such other party 
resulting from allowing the first party to 
contradict or repudiate such admission, 
statement, or act. 
Id. at 694. More recently, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
the elements of equitable estoppel are "conduct by one party which 
leads another party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of 
action resulting in detriment or damage if the first party is per-
mitted to repudiate his conduct." Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 699 P.2d 688, 691 (Utah 1985), quoting from United American 
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Life Ins. Co. v. Zions First National Bank, 641 P.2d 158, 161 
(Utah 1982). 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that equitable estop-
pel would be available under the present action only if the 
Hamblins can establish that Clearfield City, by its payments of 
certain claims, intentionally acted to induce the Hamblins to 
delay the filing of their lawsuit until the legislature passed the 
1984 amendment to §63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Furthermore, the Hamblins must establish that they have suffered 
harm as a result of the actions of Clearfield City. 
It cannot be seriously claimed that Clearfield City 
"lulled" the Hamblins into delaying the filing of their action 
until the Utah Legislature passed the immunity amendment. On the 
contrary, Clearfield City was acting in good faith when it honored 
the Hamblins1 claims. 
As stated above, the enactment of the 1984 amendment to 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 is simply a pronouncement of the common 
law previously established by this court. The Hamblins could have 
filed their suit on the first day they experienced flooding and 
their claim would have still been barred under Reeder v. Brigham 
City, 413 P.2d 300. Inasmuch as the appellant Hamblins have not 
suffered detriment or damage as a result of the actions of 
Clearfield City, the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not 
applicable in this action. 
POINT VI. 
THERE ARE SOUND PUBLIC POLICY REASONS WHY 
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR CLEARFIELD CITY. 
The management of flood waters and storm drain systems 
are a necessary function of government and the consequences of 
the same may subject private landowners to damages. Thus, we see 
there are many areas of the State of Utah in which flood waters 
have caused serious damages. The damage to property surrounding 
Utah Lake and the Great Salt Lake and the damage to property in 
Thistle, Utah, are examples of private landowners suffering 
serious damages as a result of flood waters. So also are 
numerous homeowners who have been flooded as a result of rivers 
overflowing their banks or storm drain systems backing up or 
overflowing. 
It has been determined by our legislature that the risk 
of loss under these circumstances shall not be borne by the 
municipality but rather by the individuals or by their insurance 
carriers, as the case may be. 
If the court were to rule that Clearfield City has an 
obligation to exercise eminent domain and compensate the Hamblins 
for their property, it would set a dangerous precedent upon which 
any landowner similarly situated could make similar claim. Our 
legislature has specifically precluded such liability and this 
court should not substitute its judgment for the legislative 
mandate. 
CONCLUSION 
The Harablins1 claim against Clearfield City is clearly-
barred by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and the 1984 amend-
ment to Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 is applicable to this case as a 
pronouncement of the common law previously established by this 
court. As such, equitable estoppel is not applicable since the 
Hamblins1 claim would have been barred by common law prior to the 
1984 amendment. Furthermore, this court has consistently 
recognized that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is 
not self-executing, and without legislative authority, a party may 
not sue the state or its subdivision without the state's consent. 
The legislature has denied the plaintiffs authority to sue 
Clearfield City by amending §63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. Since the Hamblins may not recover under Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, their recovery 
can only be made under the exercise of eminent domain. This 
action does not involve eminent domain and even if it did, 
appellants could not recover damages unless such damages were the 
direct, necessary, and unavoidable consequences of the right of 
eminent domain. Any damages the Hamblins have suffered would be 
construed under case law as consequential. Therefore, the ruling 
of the district court should be upheld. 
Dated this 2nd day of December
 t 1986. 
STRONG & HANNI 
-Henry E. Heathy 
CHRISTENSEN^ JENSEN & POWELL 
Robert 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
Clearfield City 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondents was mailed, first class postage 
prepaid, this 3rd day of December 1986, to the 
following: 
Kelly G. Cardon 
Kelly G. Cardon & Assoc. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Rick and Cherlynn Hamblin 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
~ \ j r & r ^ u l i L ^ ~ 
ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. §63-30-3 as amended: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in 
this chapter, all governmental entities are 
immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental 
function, governmentally-owned hospital, 
nursing home, or other governmental health 
care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care 
clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and 
other natural disasters and the construc-
tion, repair, and operation of flood and 
storm systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those 
activities. 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution: 
Private property shall not be taken or 
damaged for public use without just compen-
sation. 
ADDENDUM B f rp |M CLrr':'.*L' G'";'.?£ 
Sell L^ v-'C:-b-ry u::.r. 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Sandy City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. 3ox 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN TF.Z THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALLAN L. 3RAXENSIEK and 
MARILYN 3RAKENSIEK, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DIXIE SIX CORPORATION, SALT : 
LAKE COUNTY and SANDY CITY, : 
Defendants. : 
: ORDER 
Civil No. C84-0564 
Judge Scott Daniels 
The Motions to Dismiss of the defendants Dixie Six 
Corporation Salt Lake County, and Sandy City came before the 
Court on the regular law and motion calendar on May 11, 1984
 r 
the Honorable Scott Daniels presiding, at 2:00 p.m. The 
plaintiffs were represented by David Scofield of the law firm 
of Parsons and Crowther. Dixie Six Corporation was represented 
by Craig G. Adamson. Salt Lake County was represented by Roger 
A. Livingston. Sandy City was represented by Robert H. Henderson 
of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineau. The Court having 
heard the argument of.counsel, and having reviewed the memoranca 
on file, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and 
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the Court being of the opinion that Utah Code Annotated § 62-30-3 
as amended in 19B4 provides absolute immunity to governmental 
entities from suit for any injury or damage result from management 
of flood waters and the construction, repair, and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental entities, and the Court 
being of the further opinion that the 1984 amendment to Utah 
Code Annotated § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of action arising 
even before the amendment/ now, therefore, it is ORDERED: 
1. That the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant Salt Lake 
County be, and hereby is, granted; 
2. That the Motion to Dismiss of the defendant Sandy .City 
be, and hereby is, "granted; 
3. That the Motion to Dismiss of Dixie Six Corporation 
be, and hereby is, denied. 
DATED this ( Y day of May, 1984. 
ATTEST 
H D'.XQi4 n«Nr*LEY 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Cff^//Vcuju6v 
""" Scott Daniels 
District Court Judge 
I-
y 
Rbde^Liv^hgston 
Attorney for Sal t Lake County 
% (km 
David Scofield 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Craig Adamson 
Attorney for Defendant Dixie 
Six Corporation 
ATTIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
;TATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF S^LT LAKE ) 
Cindy C. Lewis , being sworn, says 
that she is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensc: 
L Martineau, attorneys for Defendant Sandy City 
herein, that she served the attached Order 
in Civil Number C84-0564 Third District Court 
upon the following parties by placing a true and correct ccpy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
David W. Schfield Roger A. Livingston 
PARSONS & CROWTHER Attorneys for Defendant 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Salt Lake County 
455 South 300 East, Suite 300 231 East 400 South, Sui^e 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Salt Lake City, UT 84U1 
Craig G. Adamson 
Attorney for Defendant 
Dixie Six Corporation 
220 South 200 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 1 7 t h day of May
 m, 1 9 8 4 . 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN 
May , 
before mfi^ this 171 t h day of 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
ADDENDUM C 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN I KARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Irrigation Companies, Their 
Presidents and Millard County 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLAYTON L. PALMER, and 
MARGARET D. PALMER, 
his 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY; 
JOHN DOE INSURANCE COMPANY; 
STATE OF UTAH; DEE C. HANSEN as 
Utah State Engineer; 
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER SERVICE 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; 
DELTA CANAL COMPANY; PHIL SMITH, 
President of Delta Canal Company; 
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY;* 
QUINN SHEPHARD, President of 
Melville Irrigation Company; 
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY; 
RICHARD HENRIE, President of 
Abraham Irrigation Company; 
DESERZT IRRIGATION COMPANY; 
ROGER STANWORTH, President of 
Deseret Irrigation Company, 
ROGER WALKER as Lower Sevier 
River Commissioner; MILLARD 
COUNTY; DELTA CANAL COMPANY, 
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY, and 
DESERZT IRRIGATION COMPANY d/b/a 
DMAD COMPANY; DZSZRET IRRIGATION 
COMPANY and ABRAHAM IRRIGATION 
COMPANY, d/b/a GUNNISON BEND DAM; 
IRISH ANDERSON, TONY ANDERSON, 
VINCENT CROPPER, GARY DUTSON, 
LYLE STANKORTH, THOMAS ARLO S. 
SKEEMS, the A*EL JENSEN ESTATE, 
and JOHN DOE, Conk Water Users, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 7732 
On August 15, 1984, the following Motions came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable David Sam: 
1. Plaintiffs1 Motion for Chance of Venue. 
2. Defendants Phil C. Nielsonfs and Central Utah Water 
Company's Motion to Quash. 
3. The Motions to Dismiss of the governmental entity 
defendants. 
4. The Motions to Dismiss of the defendant Irrigation 
Companies and their presidents. 
5. Defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The plaintiffs were represented by Marcus G. Theodore. 
The State defendants were represented by Dallin W. Jensen 
and Michael M. Quealy. The defendant Irrigation Companies fijnd 
their presidents and defendant Millard County were represented 
by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau. Defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation 
was represented by Joseph Novak, of counsel, Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau. 
The Court having heard and considered the arguments of 
counsel, and having reviewed the supporting affidavits and 
memoranda on file, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises: 
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The Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 as 
amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental 
entities from suit for any injury or damage resulting from 
management of flood waters and the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems by governmental entities; 
the Court concludes that the 1984 amendment to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of action arising even 
before the amendment; the Court concludes that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10 provides immunity from suit for discretionary acts 
relating to river operation, issuance of permits, and inspection 
of cams and other facilities; the Court concludes that the acts 
sued upon were governmental functions for which immunity has 
not been waived and therefore the governmental entities are 
immune from suit herein pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-3 and § 63-30-10; the Court finds that on the 
undisputed Affidavits on file there is no genuine issue of 
fact and concludes that defendant Intermountain Power Service 
Corporation is entitled to judgment of dismissal as a matter 
of law; and the Court further concludes that the Amended 
Complaint in its present form fails to give reasonable notice 
to each defendant and fails to plead a factual basis for the 
conclusory allegations of negligence. Now therefore, 
IT IS ORDERED: 
1. That the plaintiffs1 Motion for Change of Venue be, 
and hereby is denied with leave to renew the Motion at the time 
of impaneling the jury; 
2. That the Motion to Quash of the defendants Phil 
Nielson and the Central Utah Water Company be, and hereby is 
granted; 
3. That the Motions to Dismiss of the governmental 
entity defendants, i.e. , the State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as 
Utah State Engineer, Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier Commissioner, 
and Millard County be, and hereby are converted into Motions for 
Summary Judgment, and that said Motions for Summary Judgment be, 
and hereby are granted; 
4. That the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant 
Intermountain Power Service Corporation be, and hereby is granted; 
5. That the Motions to Dismiss of the defendant Presidents 
of the Irrigation Companies in their individual capacities be, 
and hereby are granted, with leave to the plaintiffs to amend 
not later than 10 days from the date hereof to allege with 
specificity acts of the Presidents taken in other than their 
capacity as Presidents of the Irrigation Companies, if any there 
be; 
6. That the Amended Complaint be, and hereby is dismissed 
with leave to the plaintiffs to amend not later than 10 days from 
the date hereof to set forth with specificity as to each 
remaining defendant, other than the-governmental entity defendants 
and defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation, the factual 
basis for the plaintiffs1 claims. 
Based thereon, now therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs, 
__.. j ^ ^ ^ r.iainfif^' Amended Complaint acainst 
defendants State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as Utah State Engineer, 
Roger Walker, as lower Sevier River Commissioner, and Millard 
County; and that 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs, 
dismissing with prejudice plaintiffs' Amended Complaint against 
defendant Intermountain Power Service Corporation. 
DATED this &+J day of August, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
prior to the signature and 
entry by the Court: 
DAVID SAM 
District Court Judge 
ROBERT'H. ANDERSON 
Attorney for Irrigation Companies, 
frelr presidents^ and Millard County 
Date: 
aZ 
fOSEPlTttOVAX <• 
Attorney for Intermountain Power 
Service Corporation 
lOAuCuit /^V 
"7 
Date : /Jc/ttssr 20 /9Jf 
MARCUS G. THEODORE 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f f 
Date; 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Utah Attorney General^ . 
MICHAEL M. QJEJzZX 
Date: 
Assistant Attorney general 
Attorney for Utah State Defendants 
Ja /9P/ 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Cindy C. Arnold
 # being sworn, says that she 
is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for Defendants The Irrigation Companies, Their 
Presidents, and Millard County herein, that she served the 
attached Proposed Order and Judgment 
in Civil NumJber 7732, Fourth Judicial District Court upon 
the following parties by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to 
Marcus G. Theodore (Hand Delivered) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Valley Tower, Suite 701 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dallin Vf. Jensen 
Michael Quealy 
Attorneys for State Defendants 
1636 West North Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Joseph Novak (Hand Delivered) 
Attorney for Defendant 
Intermountain Power Service Corp. 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Henry Heath 
Paul Belnap 
STRONG fc HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
State Farm 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
L. L. Summerhayes 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Anderson 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 64111 
Stephen R. Jackson 
Millard County Attorney 
P. O. Box 447 
Delta, UT 84624 
Thorpe Waddingham 
P. 0. Box 777' 
Delta, UT 84624 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS fc JEFFS 
Attorneys for Defendant Sk 
90 North 100 East 
P. 0. Box 683 
Provo, UT 84603 
and causing the sarr.e to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
on the c ^ ^ day of August, 1984. 
-^^~C—a^i^L 
SUBSCRIBED AND SKORN to before me thi 
IS8A 
cay of Aucust, 
ly Coirunission Expires: 
NOTARY PU3LIC 
Residing a t : r & U & 0 & ^ & f J d s ^ ^ J r 
I M . O! eve W M I C ^ E Q CO'JJ.'TV CLERK AND EX-O^FICIO CLERK OF TK-
r - v - .s j i ' i -w DISTRICT COURT IN AND FDR ^ I L L A - ; COU.JT 
c ^ . i . . . , H = ^ E E V CERT.rY THAT THE POR"D . K ;C IS A FUl i 
1: . i .-«D CORRZ' T COr 1 Op THE OR'GINAL D O C J V . E N T NOW OJ 
Fl-.E AND 0-* RECORD ! \ V-V O r c .CE AS SUCH CLE-K U-
WiTNESS r/Y HA\'D AND SEAL O f SA'D C7.L =*7 TniS r? V 
DAY OF ({ 'JO << i Y, , ^ AD., 19 J L I 
fcURuENE W-OCER. OJERK DEPUTY CXERK 
ADDENDUM D 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & KARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-90 00 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCIS B. CriESLZY and 
NONA 3. CHESLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
DELTA CITY, a Municipal 
corporation of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendant. 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on 
regularly before the Court pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the 
Rules of Practice in the District Courts of the State of Utah. 
The Court having reviewed the affidavits on filef the memoranda 
of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, and the 
Court being of the opinion that Senate Bill 97 adopted by the 
1984 Utah Legislature is an affirmation of the prior legislative 
intent with regard to flood waters, and that the plaintiffs 
claim is barred by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 as amended, now, 
therefore, it is ORDERED: 
DISTRICT COURT 
c=> c; 
I JUL ] 0 1984 
MILLARD COUNTY 
Clerk 
—~Dc -uly 
r\ 
±x - ' 3 - . , 
ORDER GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 7486 
That defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be, and 
by is, granted. 
DATED' this ty£ d ay of Ss*^< 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
Cullen Y./Christensen 
District/Court Judqe 
Arn^AviT or SEFVICI 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF1SALT LAKE ) 
Cindy C. Lewis 
,eir, - sv::rr,, st'i 
that she is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christen, 
i ttartinea-j, a:tcr:.evs for Defendant 
herein, that s^.e served the attached Proposed Order Granting 
Summary Judgment ^ 
m Civil Number 7486 , Fourth District :c-j. 
uron the fcllcv:mc parties by placir.r a true and correct czzy 
n an envelrce addressed to: 
Eldon A. Eliason 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Box 605 
Delta, UT 84624 
and causing the same to be mailed, first class, postage 
on the 21st day of June r 19£4. 
SUBSCRIBED AND S 
.Tnne ' 1 9 E 4 • 
WORN t o b e f o r e me W i s 2 1 s t day of 
/ ./I: 
ADDENDUM E 
& *_ .-i>mu«i < ULKK <0 "1 HI 
DISTRICT COUTIT 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOW, CHRISTEt:SZH 6 KARTINEAU 
Attorneys for the Irrigation Companies 
and Their Presidents and Millard County 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. 0. Box'3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
2£*1 
OCT - 3 1984 
ttXLLARD COUNTY 
Clerk 
___ Oeputv 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
EVAH CONK FAIRCHILD, 
Plaintiff, 
STATE OF UTAH; DEE C. HANSEN 
as UTAH STATE ENGINEER; DELTA 
CANAL COMPANY; PHIL SMITH, 
President of Delta Canal 
Company; MELVILLE IRRIGATION 
COMPANY; QUINN SHEPHARD, 
President of Melville 
Irrigation Company; ABRAHAM 
IRRIGATION COMPANY; RICHARD 
HENRIE, President of Abraham 
Irrigation Company; DESERET 
IRRIGATION COMPANY; ROGER 
STANWORTH, President of 
Deseret Irrigation Company; 
ROGER WALKER, as Lower Sevier 
River Commissioner; MILLARD 
COUNTY; DELTA CANAL COMPANY, 
MELVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY, 
and DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY 
dba DMAD COMPANY; DESERET 
IRRIGATION COMPANY and 
ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY 
dba GUNNISON BEND DAM; and 
JOHN DOE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
ORDER, JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER EXPRESSLY 
DIRECTING ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT 
TO RULE .54 (b) 
Civil No. 7733 
On September 21, 1984, the following Motions came on 
regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Robert Bullock 
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Arena Complaint; and 
2. The Motions to Dismiss of the defendants. 
The plaintiff was represented by Marcus G. Theodore. 
The State defendants were represented by Dallin W. Jensen 
and Michael M. Quealy. The defendant Irrigation Companies and 
their Presidents and defendant Millard County were represented 
by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
The Court having heard and considered the arguments of 
counsel, and having reviewed the supporting affidavits and 
memoranda on file, and the Court being fully advised in the 
premises: 
As to the Motions to Dismiss, the Court concludes that 
Utah Code Ann. § 63*30-3 as amended in 1984 provides absolute 
immunity to governmental entities from suit for any injury^r 
damage resulting from management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems 
by governmental entities; the Court concludes that the 1984 
amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes 
of action arising even before the amendment; the Court concludes 
that Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 provides immunity from suit for 
discretionary acts relating to river operation, issuance of 
permits, and inspection of dams and other facilities; the Court 
concludes that the acts sued upon were governmental functions 
for which immunity has not been waived and therefore the 
governmental entities are immune from suit herein pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 and § 63-30-10; 
and the Court further concludes that the Complaint in its 
present form fails to give reasonable notice to each defendant 
and fails to plead a factual basis for the conclusory allegations 
of negligence. 
As to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, the Court 
concludes that the Motion is untimely and that the plaintiff 
has failed to offer any explanation for the untimeliness of 
the Motion; the Court further concludes that the Proposed 
Amendment would be futile in that, inter alia, it proposes to 
name as a defendant the insurer of the Irrigation Companies, 
its proposes to name Intermountain Power Service Corporation, an 
entity that, on the undisputed facts, had no ownership interest 
whatsoever in the Irrigation Companies, used no water from the 
Sevier River, and at no time participated in the activities of 
which plaintiff complains, it proposes to name plaintiff's own 
insurer, it would still fail to give reasonable notice to 
each defendant and still fails to plead a factual basis for 
the conclusory allegations of negligence, and in that it still 
would not, and could not, state a civil rights claim under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 because, as a matter of law, the one time 
flood that occurred does not constitute a "taking". 
Now, therefore, IT IS ORDERED: 
1. That the plaintiff's Morion for Leave to Amend 
be, and hereby is denied; 
2. That the Motions to Dismiss of the governmental 
entity defendants, i.e., the State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as 
Utah State Engineer, Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier Commissioner, 
and Millard County be, and hereby are granted; 
3. That the Motions to Dismiss of the Defendant 
Presidents of the Irrigation Companies in their individual 
capacities be, and hereby are granted, with leave to the 
plaintiff to amend not later than 10 days from_ the date hereof 
to allege with specificity acts of the Presidents taken in other 
than their capacity as Presidents of the Irrigation Companies, 
if any there be; 
4. That the Complaint be, and hereby is dismissed 
with leave to the plaintiff to amend not later than 10 da/s 
from the date hereof to set forth with specificity as to each 
remaining defendant, other than the governmental entity 
defendants, the factual basis for the plaintifffs claims. 
Based thereon, now therefore, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED 
AND DECREED that: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiff, 
dismissing with prejudice plaintiff's Complaint against 
defendants State of Utah, Dee C. Hansen, as Utah State Engineer, 
Roger Walker, as Lower Sevier River Commissioner, and Millard 
County. 
The Court hereby expressly determines that there is 
no just reason for delay and hereby expressly directs that 
this Judgment and the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Leave to Amend be entered as a final judgment within the 
meaning of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED this ^r ^^cay of , 1984 
~/3T Robert Bullock 
{district Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
prior to the signature and 
entry by the Court: 
ROBERT H. HENDERSON 
Attorney for Irrigation Companies 
their Presidents, and Millard 
County 
Date Z7SfiPTrf5J 
MARCUS G. THEODORE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Date: 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Utah Attorney Generc 
/Lt 
Ass i s t an t Attorney/General 
Attorney for Utah s t a t e 
Defendants 
Date: Sft~c27 * /ft"/ 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss • 
Cindv C. Arnold , being sworn, says that she 
is employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Kartineau, 
attorneys for Defendants The Irrigation Companies, Their 
Presidents, and Millard County herein, that she served the 
attached Order, Judgment and Order Expressly Directing 
Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) 
in Civil Number 7733, Fourth Judicial District Court upon 
the following parties by placing a true and correct copy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Marcus G. Theodore (Hand Delivered) 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Valley Tower, Suite 701 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Dallin W. Jensen 
Michael Quealy 
Attorneys for State Defendants 
1636 West North Temple, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Joseph Novak 
Attorney for Defendant 
Intermountain Power Service Corp. 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Kenry Heath 
Paul Belnap 
STRONG S HANKI 
Attorneys for Defendant 
State Farm 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
L. L. Summerhayes 
STRONG k HANKI 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Anderson 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Stephen R. Jackson 
Millard County Attorney 
P. O. Box 447 
Delta, UT 84624 
Thorpe Waddingham 
P. 0. Box 777 
Delta, UT 84624 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorneys for Defendant Skeems 
90 North 100 East 
P. O. Box 683 
Provo# UT 84603 
and causing the sarr.e to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
on the 27th day of September __, 1984. 
^ a 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 27th day of 
September , 19 8 4. 
My Commission Expires: 
t/toh 
0*/£,„,. J' -^LJ^ 
V NOTARY PUBLIC 
"Residmc in Salt Lake City, UT 
^OU^Th • * 
STA^E C ; ' 
TRUE A'.- ' -'•• 
FILE AND OF ^ * 
WITNESS t.'V t" 
- - . . -v/ r,LPq»< AND EX-0FF1CK3 CLERK O f THr 
* * <f> AND FOR MILLARD COUNT\ 
.r . "Mr =OREGO'»NG IS A FULL 
1
 Or- IV-'E OzK-'r ->L DOCUMENT NOW Of-
">' OFF.CF AS SUC- C'.ER/v tL 
.,-*:o SEAL OF SAID COUTT TH«S 
A 0 , 1> 3 
ADDENDUM F 
153* OCT 3 0 IK 9 5 ? 
R03ERT H. HENDERSON 
SNOV:, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Orem City 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 3 00 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL MENDENHALL; SARAH 
JAN BURY; BRENT STARK; 
ROBERT CONOVER and VALERIE 
CONOVER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNIVERSITY MALL, INC., a 
corporation; OREM CITY 
CORPORATION, a municipal 
corporation; MERRILL 
GAPPMAYER, 
Defendants. 
Defendant Orem City's Motion for Summary Judgment came 
on for oral argument on October 26, 1984. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Thomas S. Taylor of the law firm Christensen, 
Taylor & Moody. Defendant Orem City was represented by 
Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, Christensen & Martineau. 
The Court having heard the argument of counsel, and 
having reviewed and considered the memoranda on file, and 
being fully advised in the premises: 
*7.fcLUN.rJ' 
JL. . ! ) ! 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 62,597 
The Court concludes that Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-3 
as amended in 1984 provides absolute immunity to governmental 
entities from suit for any injury or damage resulting from 
management of flood waters and the construction, repair, 
and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities; the Court concludes that the 1984 amendment to 
the Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-3 is applicable to causes of 
action arising even before the amendment; the Court concludes 
that the acts Orem City has been sued upon were governmental 
functions for which immunity has not been waived and "that, 
therefore, the governmental entity, Orem City, is immune from 
suit herein pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
§ 63-30-3. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
Judgment be, and hereby is entered against plaintiffs and in 
favor of the defendant Orem City dismissing with prejudice 
plaintiffs' Complaint against defendant Orem City* 
DATED this <^V day of October, 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
J?J2S 
George E, 
District Cour 
aTlif / 
t Judg6 
A " : DAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Cindy C. Arnold , being sworn, says 
that she is enployed in the law offices of Snow, Chnstense.n 
£ Kartineau, attorneys for Defendant Orem City 
herein, that she served the attached Proposed Order and Judgment 
in Civil Nunber 62,597 , Fourth District Court 
upon the following parties by placing a true zr.z correct cczy 
thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Thomas S. Taylor Merrill Gappmayer 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 1156 South State Street 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Suite 202 
55 East Center Street Orem, UT 84057 
P. O. Box 14 66 
Provo, UT 84603 Paul S. Felt 
400 Deseret Building 
Bryce McEuen Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Orem City Attorney 
56 North State Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
and causing the sane to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, 
on the 26th day cf October , 1984 . 
SU5SCRIEED AND SKORN to before meMihis 26th day of 
October , 19 54. 
ADDENDUM G 
FLOOD RELIEF - 1984 
1964 
BUDGET SESSION 
Enrolled Copy 
S. B. No. 97 By fred W. Finlmson 
AN ACT RELATING TO FLOODING; CLARIFYING FLOODING AS A 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION FOR PURPOSES OF GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY; PROVIDES AS CRITERIA FOR TnE DR3 FUNDING MULTI-
COUNTY FLOOD DAMACE; GIVING EMERCENCY FLOOD TONERS TO THE 
STATE ENGINEER; CREATING A TASK FORCE TO LOOK AT INTER-
COUNTY FI/>OD!NG; STATING THAT IT IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS 
<JF THE STATE AND ITS POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS TO MANACE TtiE 
STATE'S BODIES OF WATER; APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR FLOODING; 
AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 63-30-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 19S3, AS 
ENACTED BY CHAPTER 116, LAWS OF UTAH 1981, AND SECTION 63-
S2a-10, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 
15, LAWS OF UTAH 1983, FIRST SPECIAL SESSION; ENACTS 
SECTIONS 63-52a-1.5 AND 73-2-22, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, 
AND ENACTS NEW MATERIAL. 
B
.
e
. -
11
. enacted bv the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 63-30-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
last amended by Chapter 116, Lavs of Utah 1981, is amended to 
read: 
63-30-3. Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
jaetj chapter, all governmental entities are inaune from suit 
foi any injury which results from the exercise of a 
«l«»v«"i iiiitfii I a 1 luii' t Mm, (jovei nmcnla ] ] y-own^J hor.p J to I , nil) Z) n<) 
hoMif, «»t ol IM-I M'»V«-I nmcnt.i J hedlth c *•? * - l.icjhty, a\\0 fiom an 
• tppt <«v«*tl nifd 11 ."> I , nut ;.j itcj, oi other pi ol «.•:.:. i una 1 health care 
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clinical training program concucted in either public 01 piivate 
facilities. 
The management of flood waters and the construction, 
repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered to be governmental 
functions ,_ and governmental entities and _ the 1 r_ of fj cers and 
employees are immune from suit for any miury or damage 
resulting from those activities. 
Section 2. Section 63-523-10, Utah Code Annotated 2953, 
as enacted by Chapter 15, Laws of Utah 1983, First Special 
Session, is amended to read: 
63-52a-10. (1) As a condition of any disaster relief 
funds granted under this chapter, the receiving political 
subdivision shall agree that any repair or construction to be 
financed therewith shall be in accordance with applicable 
standards of safety, decency, and sanitation and in conformity 
with applicable codes, specifications, and standards, and shall 
furnish such evidence of compliance with this section as may be 
required by the DRB. As a further condition of receiving a 
disaster relief grant under this chapter, the receiving 
political subdivision r,hal) agree Hint tho nntuidl ha;;;»i Or. in 
the nic;i.. in wlij'li UK- puKt'cd:. ol U»»- MI.nit.. ,n <• to !>«• u..»-d 
will be evaluated and appiopnate action taken to nutjyate 
those hazards, including safe land use and construction 
practices, in accordance with standards prescribed or approved 
by the DRB after adequate consultation with the governing body 
of the political subdivision to which the grant is to be made. 
(2) Whenever the DRB considers a request for disaster 
relief funds for a political subdivision and there is a 
potential for multiple county flood damage, the political 
subdivision must provide the DR£ with information on the effect 
any prefect has on downstream c_ount:es_ That infoimation 5,hall 
be considered as part of the DRB' s cnteiia foi approving the 
funding. 
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Section 3. Section 73-2-22, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is 
enacted to read: 
73-2-2_2 Whenever the state engineer, with approval of 
the chairman of the Disaster Emergency Advisory Council, makes 
a written finding that any reservoir or stream has reached or 
will reach during the current water year a level far enough 
above average and in excess of capacity that public safety is 
or is likely to be endangered or that substantial property 
damage _ i s _o_c cu r r i_ng or is likely to occur, he shall have 
emergency powers until the danger to the public and property is 
abated. Emergency powers shall consist of the authority to 
control stream flow and reservoir storage or release. The 
state engineer must protect existing water rights to the 
maximum extent possible when exercising emergency powers. Any 
action taken by the state engineer under this section shall be 
by written order. 
If any person refuses or neglects to comply with any order 
of the state engineer issued pursuant to his emergency powers, 
the state engineer may bring action in the name of the state in 
the district court to enforce them. In carrying out his 
emergency powers, the state engineer shall have rights of 
access to private and public property. 
Any person affected by a decision of the state engineer 
made under his emergency powers shall have the right to seek 
injunctive lelief, including temporary lestiammg orders a_nd 
tempoinry injunctions in any district court of the comity where 
that peison lesioes No order of the state engineer shall be 
enjoined or set aside unless shown by clear and convincing 
evidence that an emergency does not in fact exist or that the 
order of the state engineer is arbitrary or capricious. The 
previsions cf Sections 73-3-14 and 73-3-15 shall not be 
applicaple to any crdei of the state engineer issued pursuant 
to this section. 
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Section 4. There is created a Flood Control Task Force to 
study inter-ccunty flooding problems. The task foice shall be 
comprised of the following representatives: 
(1) to be appointed by the Governor: 
(a) a member _representinq the ciovernoi ; 
(b) a merr.Dei lepic: cut NI«I the Dej^ i J t imjn l of N,itwr<»] 
Resource."; 
(c) fou_r members ^present i nrj the counties; 
(d) three members represeiit:iig_cities and towns; 
(e) three members representing water users, two of whom 
must have irrigation interests; 
(2) to be appointed by the house chairman of the Energy 
and Natural Resources Study Committee, four house members; 
(3) to be appointed by the senate chairman of the Energy 
and Narural Resources Study Committee, three senate members. 
The task force shall prepare a plan to solve the problems 
of multiple county flood control jurisdiction and shall report 
that plan to the 19S5 General Session of _the_ legislature^ 
Section 5. Section 63-52a-1.5>, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
is enacted to read: 
63-52a-1.5. The legislature finds that unusual weather 
conditions in the last several ye a rs have caused high water 
levels m the state's streams, reservoirs, and lakes. It is in 
the best interest cf the state and its political subdivisions 
to manage those bodies of water. 
Section 6. The following appropriations are made from the 
General Fund for fiscal year 19S3/84: 
COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Item 1. To Coirjr.unit y Development/Pisaster 
Relief Board for addressing 
the following possible needs: $20, 600, 000 
a. 1983 unmet flood needs $13,400,000 
b. Dredging requests on 
Jordan, Spanish Fork,_ and 
S E. No. 97 
I'l <>\>t, h v t ' i s 1 ,400,000 
c FEN*- p:ojects_ fiom 19S_3 500, 000 
d 19S4 flood mi t: £i_a t i_on 4_, S00 000 
e. To be used in emeuiency 
situations vhei_e thei e i s 
an impending health or 
safety threat that has not 
otherwise been provided for 1,000,000 
These funds shall not lapse at the end of 
f_iscal_ year 19S3/S4 £^ cL__fLnY unexpended 
amounts shall cairy over to fiscal year 
I984/RS } \ } • . the inUnt of the le«ji«-latue 
that the DKC cjjve top piiori^y to mi ticjati/icj 
the flood damage potential along the entire 
length of the Jordan River It is further 
the intent of the legislature that the DRB 
may use funds not otherwise encumbered to 
participate with a project sponsor to 
purchase liability insurance. 
FU5LIC SAFETY 
Item 2. To Commissioner's Office 2, 600,000 
To cover costs __for the Lower Diversion 
Tunnel and clean up measures at Thistle. 
These funds sha 11_ not_lapse at the end of 
fiseal year 1983,84 and any unexpended 
amounts shall carry over to fiscal year 
1984/85. 
However, if there is FEMA participation or 
other savings in these projects, an amount 
equal to that participation or project 
savings shall lapse 
Item 3 To Commissioner's Office 20,000 
S. 5. Nc. 97 
To cover expenses associ ated_ wi th_ fJ.ood_ing_. 
a. Copy work on dnta sc\)\ 
to FEMA $ 5,000 
b . I n t e r n a l ^ a u d : t o i t o r m d i t 
b i l l i n g s b e i n g p r o c e s ^ o d 
by FEMA 15, 000 
Item 4. To Highway Patrol 100, 000 
To cover expenses associated with flooriino. 
Item S. To Comprehensive Emergency Management 564,000 
a. 800,000 sandbags $271 , 000 
b. Overtime 7 , 000 
c. Large capacity __umps (1Q) 78, 0_00 
d_. Heavv_ equipment, pi lvnte 
aircraft rentals .46<99_9 
e. Emergency Operating Center 
operations 12,000 
f. State's share of individual 
family grant program for 
1984 flooding 150,000 
These funds shall not lapse at the end of 
fiscal year 1983/84 and any unexpended 
a_moun_t_5 shall carry over _to _fiscal year 
1984/85. 
Item 6. To Commissioner's Office 125 , 000 
To provide the state's match for individual 
and family federal grant assistance provided 
during 1983 flooding. 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
Item 7. To Utah Geological and Mineral Survey 7 , 300 
To cover projected overtime for _1984 
flooding. 
Item 8. To Wildlife Resources 10,000 
To cover expenses of diking around 
residences at state bird refuges. 
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It err, 9. To Parks and Recreation 69S( 000 
To cover expenses associated with floodinc. 
Iter. 10. To Water Fesources 700,000 
To covei expenses of_ the development and 
imp I ernent_a_tion of a state water plan. The 
plan shall propose long-term solutions to 
the excess of water m certain hydrologic 
basins and the lack of water m other 
basins. The plan shall consider water 
management throuch trans-basin diversion. 
The purpose of the plan shall be to maximize 
the use of available water for aan cul ture, 
municipal, industrial, recreation, and 
wildlife uses within the state. 
As part of the plan, the division shall 
prepare a list of water development proiects 
that are complementary to one another with 
estimated costs and probable engineering, 
economic, and environmental feasibility. 
The plan shall focus particular emphasis on 
the Bear River and Utah Lake drainage but 
wi_l_l _include all_ hydrologic areas of the 
state. The plan shall identify the impact 
of that system on the economic base of the 
state, and on flooding problems, and shall 
prioritize the most feasible prefects. 
The divisi on shall rake periodic reports to 
the Energy and Natural Resources Study 
Committee and the Agriculture and Health 
Study Committee. The division shall report 
its findings to the 19SS General Session of 
the legislature 
The funds shall not lapse at the end_of 
f-^r*l ufiar- -act r. \ -~~> • * 
S E. No 97 
aiBCjr.ts shall carry over to fiscal year 
1964/85 
HEALTH 
It err, 11. To Administration 300, 000 
To cover expenses of mosquito abatement 
activities and diking to protect wastewater 
treatment plants. 
AGRICULTURE 
It err 12. To Agriculture Resource Development 
Loan Fund 1 . 000_, 000 
To cover expenses of loan", to faimci.*-;. 
These fund . >.hn3 1 not 1 apse «it the unci of 
fiscal year 1963/64 and any unexpenced 
amounts shall carry over to fiscal year 
1984/85. 
TRANSPO_RTAT1 ON 
Item 13. To State Construction 1,000,000 
To_ _c_cver expenses o_£ e m e_ ra eii£v_ work on 
highways. 
These funds shall not lapse a_t_ the end of 
fiscal yeai 1983/84 and nny unexp'-nd'-d 
.jinountr. : )\.i I 1 r,n ) y ovo to } i ..( .i I y .i i 
1984/85 
NATIONAL GUARD 
Iter 14. To Administration 518, 000 
To cover expenses of air force missions, 
army air support, and personnel 
These funds shall not lapse at the end of 
fiscal year 1983/64 and any unexpended 
amounts shall carry over to fiscal year 
1954/65. 
Section 7 This act shall take effect upon_a£piova 1 by 
the governor, or tr.e cay following the constitutional time 
-6-
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limit of Article VII, Sec. 8 without the governor's signature, 
or in the case of veto, the date of veto override. 
